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Trade economists often estimate gravity equations of international trade with xed
eects. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, American Economic Review 93, 170{192)
have shown the importance of controlling for multilateral trade resistances when esti-
mating a gravity equation. This can be done by including exporter-time and importer-
time xed eects in a panel or exporter and importer xed eects in a cross section
estimation. I argue that this approach limits the identiability of policy parameters
that capture the eect of certain "club memberships" (EU, NAFTA, euro area, WTO,
etc.) on trade 
ows. I show that, in the baseline case, only one eect can be identied,
which precludes, for example, the estimation of separate eects on the exporter and the
importer side. The magnitude, and even the sign, of the estimated club eect are very
sensitive to the precise identication assumptions, which are often left unspecied in
empirical studies. The underlying problem is that club membership provides some, but
very little bilateral variation. When heterogeneous club eects are to be identied, the
membership dummies can become perfectly collinear with the xed eects. Empirical
researchers may not be aware of the lack of identication, because standard estimation
techniques often permit them to run perfectly collinear regressions. I illustrate the
ndings with estimating the eect of EU enlargement in 2004 on the trade 
ows of new
and old members. Finally, I discuss potential solutions.
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11 Introduction
Measuring the eects of economic clubs (trade agreements, customs unions, currency unions)
on bilateral trade has always been a central issue in the empirical trade literature. Many
studies estimate gravity equations to quantify the eects of such club memberships, which
are typically captured by dummy variables. Sometimes more than one club dummies are
included to measure heterogenous eects.1 The seminal paper of Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) has shown that gravity estimations should control for the multilateral trade resistances
of the exporter and the importer countries to obtain unbiased estimates. This is often done
by including xed eects: exporter and importer eects in cross section estimations and
country pair, exporter-time and importer-time eects in panels.
In this paper I consider the above xed eects gravity specication and argue that its
ability to identify club membership eects is very limited. In the baseline case, which includes
cross section estimations and panels without sequential changes in club memberships, only
one parameter can be identied, which implies that heterogeneous club eects cannot be
estimated. For instance, it is not possible to separately identify the eect of joint versus one-
sided membership. Similarly, one cannot estimate dierential eects on the two directions
of trade between countries. Moreover, the magnitude and also the sign of the estimate for
the one identiable parameter is very sensitive to the identication assumption. Depending
on whether only joint membership or both joint and one-sided membership is assumed to
aect trade, the estimate can turn into its negative. This casts doubt on the economic sense
of the estimates.
The explanation for these problems is the following. The xed eects net out all variation
from the data except for the bilateral variation in cross sections and the time-varying bilateral
variation in panels. At the same time, the club membership dummy has some, but very little
bilateral (time-varying bilateral) variation. This limited variation allows the identication
of only one parameter. Estimates under dierent identifying assumptions are simple linear
transformations of this one parameter. When two or more club dummies are included,
identication becomes infeasible due to perfect collinearity of the club dummies with the
xed eects.
I derive the main ndings analytically for the simplest cross section case. Then I show,
on the example of EU enlargement in 2004, that the identication problems extend to multi-
1Both the WTO and the euro is found to have aected the trade of two members and the trade of a
member and a non-member dierently. See Rose (2004), Baldwin, Skudelny and Taglioni (2005) and Flam
and Nordstr om (2006).
2period panel estimations. Attempting to measure the trade eect of EU entry on a database
of bilateral trade 
ows of EU entrants and insiders I nd that, depending on the identication
assumption, the parameter estimates vary between -0.007 and 0.007, not dierent from zero
statistically. Heterogeneous eects (on trade of an entrant with an insider versus on trade
of two entrants) cannot be estimated because of perfect collinearity.
The presence of perfect collinearity is not always apparent from the estimation results.
This carries the risk that the researcher overlooks the problem. I demonstrate it by using
two popular methods in STATA: Fixed Eects Least Squares Dummy Variables (FE-LSDV)
estimation and the method of OLS on the demeaned variables.2 Under unidentiability
both methods fail to drop the perfectly collinear club dummy and report false estimates.
The former drops one of the country-time dummies instead of the club dummy. The latter
drops the club dummy only if the database is balanced, also including self-trade, which is
rarely the case with trade databases.
The above identication problems do not always persist. They are not present for dum-
mies with richer bilateral variation. Dummies like common language, common border, or
FTA in general, typically incorporate more than one category (of language, border, FTA)
and provide more bilateral variation even in cross section data. In panel databases, sequen-
tial entries to (or exits from) a club create extra variation and helps avoid the identication
problem.
A further potential remedy, which I demonstrate on the example of EU enlargement, is
to extend the database of EU entrants and insiders with trade 
ows of outsider (i.e. non-EU)
countries. On such an extended database the xed eects gravity can identify heterogeneous
club eects up to four (linearly independent) club dummies. Nevertheless, I will show,
this approach also has its limitations. Trade protection between entrants and outsiders fell
signicantly with EU enlargement. If I include an additional dummy variable to control for
this change, the original identication problem returns.
Finally, one can look for alternative ways to account for the multilateral trade resistances
in the gravity equation, a recent summary of which is in Anderson (2011). In this paper I
provide alternative estimates for the EU's trade eect by using the trade cost index proposed
by Novy (2008) and Head and Ries (2001). These estimates show that trade expanded by
2The former is xed eects estimation with country pair xed eects, while exporter-time and importer-
time eects are included among the regressors as dummies. The latter method rst nets out all the xed
eects from the RHS and LHS variables with the corresponding within transformation and then estimates
by OLS. In principle, the two methods lead to identical estimates.
3as much as 40% in the entering countries, and trade of two entrants was aected twice as
strongly as trade between entrants and insiders.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the cross section gravity equation
and examines identiability of club membership eects by solving for the estimates ana-
lytically under four dierent identication assumptions. Section 3 discusses the panel data
case and presents the empirical application. The panel is extended with outsider countries
in Section 4. Section 5 presents the alternative estimates based on the trade cost index.
Summary and discussion is in Section 6.
2 Cross section gravity
The traditional way of estimating gravity equations has been criticized since the equation
gained rm theoretical grounds. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) show that the traditional
gravity, which does not account for the multilateral trade resistances of the exporter and
the importer countries, yields biased estimates. In the theory-based gravity, bilateral trade









where Xij is the trade 
ow from country i to j, Yi and Yj are nominal income levels of the
exporter and the importer, Y w is world income, ij denotes bilateral trade barriers and i
and Pj are the multilateral trade resistances.  is the elasticity of substitution between all
goods. The multilateral trade resistance of the exporter (i) is an average of the bilateral
trade barriers that the exporter faces in all the destination markets in the world. The
importer's multilateral trade resistance (Pj) is an average of the bilateral trade barriers that
the importer imposes on goods from all the countries in the world. Since these two depend
on all the bilateral trade barriers of the exporter and the importer, omitting them from the
empirical gravity equation introduces a bias in the estimation of the eect of any bilateral
trade barrier.
Log-linearizing (1) yields
xij = yi + yj   y
w + (1   )lnij   (1   )i   (1   )pj; (2)
where lower-case x, y,  and p denote natural logarithms of trade, income and multilateral
trade resistance terms.
Getting an estimable equation from (2) is not straightforward. First, i and pj are not
observable variables. Although more recently several approaches have been developed to
4account for these two terms (e.g. Novy, 2008, Baier and Bergstrand, 2009), the most easily
implementable, and hence the most popular, remains estimation with xed eects. Second,
lnij is usually assumed to be some linear function of dierent observable bilateral trade
barriers. In this paper I assume that it is a function of club membership, Dij, with some
parameter  and an additive measurement error, such that lnij = Dij +ij.3 The ij error
is assumed to be uncorrelated with the club dummy.
Then, the estimable xed eect gravity becomes
xij = Dij + i + j + "ij: (3)
The coecient that gives the trade eect of club membership is  = (1   ). The exporter
and importer xed eects, i and j, respectively, soak up both the income variables and
the multilateral trade resistances. The error term is "ij = (1   )ij.
2.1 Identication assumptions
So far I have not specied the club membership dummy in (3). In order to do so, notice
that there are two types of countries with respect to club membership, member (A) and non-
member (B), which generate four types of trade 
ows. On Figure 1, xAA denotes observations
of trade between two members, xAB trade from a member to a non-member, xBA trade from
a non-member to a member and xBB trade between two non-members.
Figure 1: Trade 




For which observations Dij is 1 and for which it is 0 depends on the precise identication
assumption on the eects of club membership. It is customary to assume that trade between
non-members (xBB) is unaected and to use these observations as benchmark (control group,
reference group) in the estimation. What to assume about the three other types of trade 
ows
is ultimately an empirical question. In what follows I consider four dierent identication
assumptions:
1. xAA is aected, the other three are the benchmark;
3I abstract from other bilateral trade barriers like geographical distance in order to make the following
derivations as simple as possible. This can be done without loss of generality of the main results.
52. xAA, xAB and xBA are all aected to the same extent, xBB is the benchmark;
3. xAA, xAB and xBA are all aected, but xAA is to a dierent extent than the other two,
xBB is the benchmark;
4. xAB and xBA are aected to the same extent, xAA and xBB are the benchmark.
The identication assumption determines the exact formulation of the club membership
dummy. Under the rst assumption, Dij is 1 for trade between two members and 0 otherwise.
Under the second, Dij is 1 for trade of pairs with at least one member and 0 for trade of
two non-members. Under the third assumption, there are two club dummies: the rst is 1
only for trade of two members and the second is 1 for trade between a member and a non-
member. Under the fourth assumption, the club dummy is 1 for trade between a member
and a non-member and 0 otherwise.
The dierence between the rst and the second identication assumptions is whether
one-sided membership is also believed to aect trade. The third identication assumption
allows the eect of joint membership to be dierent (usually stronger) than the eect of one-
sided membership. Rose (2004, 2005) follows a similar approach by examining separate trade
eects for joint and one-sided WTO membership. An example of the fourth identication
assumption is the US-Canada border eect literature, initiated by McCallum (1995), which
looks at how much less US and Canadian states trade across the border (international trade)
than within the border (intranational trade). In this context, \member" denotes a US state
and \non-member" a Canadian state, or vice versa.
2.2 Identiability
I examine the identiability of the club membership eect under each of the four identication
assumptions by analytically deriving the  estimates. For that I assume that the cross section
database includes all trade 
ows between nA member and nB non-member countries. The
total number of observations is then N2, where N = nA + nB. Notice that this sample is
balanced and also includes self-trade, i.e. trade of a country within its own borders. In the
empirical part I show that the main ndings on identiability extend to samples without
self-trade, although the exact  estimates are then dierent.
A simple way to solve for the club eect estimate is to net out the exporter and importer
xed eects in (3) from the left-hand side variable and from the club membership dummy
and run OLS regression on the demeaned variables. The ij-th element of the vector of the
6demeaned left-hand side variable,  x, is


















and similarly for the club dummy,  D.4 Then, the estimate for  can be obtained via the
OLS formula ^  =

 D0  D
 1
 D0 x.
Let us rst derive the demeaned club dummy under the rst identication assumption

















A is the column vector of ones of dimension n2
A, 0nAnB is the column vector of zeros
of dimension nAnB and 0n2
B is the column vector of zeros of dimension n2
B. Applying the
































































The demeaned club dummies under the other three identication assumptions can be simi-
larly obtained.
4This formula, also called within transformation formula, is present in several Econometrics textbook like
e.g. Baltagi (2001). The demeaning formula for the panel equation (8) is more complicated. I provide a
derivation of it in Appendix B.
7The demeaning of the left-hand side variable (xij) can be simplied by observing that
only variation across the country pair groups AA, AB, BA and BB matters for identication.
Then, individual observations for xij within each group can be replaced by their group means,
and the left-hand side variable can be expressed in the following vector form
x =
2
6 6 6 6
4
 xAA  1n2
A
 xAB  1nAnB
 xBA  1nAnB
 xBB  1n2
B
3
7 7 7 7
5
;
where  xAA is the mean of trade 
ows between two members,  xAB is the mean of trade 
ows
from a member to a non-member and so on. Applying the within transformation formula






















 =  xAA    xAB    xBA +  xBB: (6)
Using  x and the  Ds, it is straightforward to calculate the OLS estimates for the club mem-
bership eects.
I present the demeaned club dummies together with the  estimates in Table 1. The
rows represent the dierent identication assumptions. It is immediately apparent that the
demeaned club dummies are all perfectly collinear, since all of them are multiples of the
same vector by a factor of 1, -1 or -2. This explains that more than one club dummies (3.
identication assumption) cannot be separately identied. The xed eects gravity equation
in a cross section database cannot tell whether joint membership has stronger trade eect
than one-sided membership. (An alternative way to show unidentiability under the third
identication assumption is presented in Appendix A.)
When the club eect is identied (1., 2. and 4. identication assumptions), the estimate
is  or some simple transformation of it. Since  is determined as in (6), the estimates are
based on very little data variation, namely the variation across the four groups of 
ows in
Figure 1. As a result, the estimates are very sensitive to the change in the identication
assumption. When only joint membership is assumed to have an eect on trade, the esti-
mated eect is . When both joint and one-sided membership is believed to aect trade,
the estimate is  . Under the last identication assumption, the estimate is  =2.
8Table 1: The demeaned club dummies and the s
IA Demeaned club dummy (  D) ^ 
1 N 2z 
2  N 2z  
3.1 N 2z not identied
3.2  2N 2z separately
4  2N 2z  =2
3 The panel analogue
Most of the recent gravity estimations work with panel data. These applications assume
that the gravity equation holds in all the time units (t) of the panel. The panel version of
(2) is
xijt = yit + yjt   y
w
t + (1   )lnijt   (1   )it   (1   )pjt: (7)
Notice that the multilateral trade resistances also vary with time. Controlling for them with
xed eects therefore requires exporter-time and importer-time eects.
Let the bilateral trade barrier function be additively separable in its time-varying and
time-constant components, where the time-varying component is the club membership dummy
and an additive error term, such that lnijt = ij + Dijt + ijt. All time-constant bilateral
barriers are captured in ij, and the ijt error term is assumed to be uncorrelated with the
club dummy. Then, the panel xed eects gravity equation is
xijt = Dijt + ij + it + jt + "ijt; (8)
where it and jt exporter-time and importer-time xed eects, respectively, control for the
income variables and the multilateral resistances. This panel xed eects gravity specication
was recently suggested by several papers (Baltagi, Egger and Pfaermayr, 2003; Baldwin and
Taglioni, 2006; Baier and Bergstrand, 2007) as the theory-consistent xed eects gravity.5
Earlier panel gravity estimations, which do not control for the time-varying multilateral
resistances, use only country or country-pair xed eects. Separate exporter and importer
eects were proposed by the early paper of M aty as (1997). Egger and Pfaermayr (2003)
and Cheng and Wall (2005) argue for country pair eects (such as ij in (8)). Many elements
of bilateral trade costs, like those related to culture or institutions, cannot be observed and
hardly change with time. Unless the regressor of interest is also time-invariant, it has become
5Eicher and Henn (2009) also uses this specication.
9customary to include country pair xed eects to avoid omitted variable biases stemming
from these unobserved trade barriers.
An important dierence from the cross section case is that the panel xed eects gravity
equation (8) identies  only from the changes of club membership in time, because the
country pair xed eects net out all the time-constant variation. This means that one can
estimate the eect of club membership only if some countries in the sample enter the club
during the sample period.6 Identication is therefore not based on the dierence between
members' and non-members' trade as in the cross section case, but on the dierence between
the evolution of trade of entering countries relative to countries that do not change their
membership status.
It can be shown that the identication problems in Section 2 also extend to the estimation
of (8) on panel data. The necessary condition for that is that club entry occurs at the same
time for all entering countries, i.e. there are no sequential entries. In this case, the time
period of the panel can clearly be divided into a pre-entry and a post-entry period. For such
a panel, (8) can be transformed into a cross section equation like (3) by time-averaging the
observations in both the pre-entry and the post-entry periods and time-dierencing across
these two periods to get
dxij = dDij + i + j + d"ij; (9)
where d: denotes change from the pre-entry to the post-entry period. All the derivations in
Section 2.2 apply for (9), with xij and Dij in (3) replaced by dxij and dDij.
Again, the exact specication of dD depends on the identication assumption. I assume
that the panel includes two types of countries with respect to club membership: entrants,
who enter the club, and insiders, who are members of the club during the sample period.7
Figure 2 shows the four dierent 
ows of trade with entrants and insiders.
Figure 2: Trade 




The four identication assumptions are the same as in Section 2.1, with entrants and
insiders replacing members and non-members. The change in trade between two insiders
(dxBB) is always part of the benchmark. It is based on the assumption that club membership
6I do not consider the symmetric case of exits.
7I consider countries who are not members in Section 4.
10aects trade growth only shortly after entry, so the growth of insiders' mutual trade is not
aected by their membership status any more.
3.1 EU enlargement example
I demonstrate the analytical ndings on identiability and their extension to panel data
on the example of the enlargement of the European Union in 2004. The EU is a customs
union, which means tari-free intra-EU trade and a common external trade protection.8 I
use a database of all annual bilateral trade 
ows of eight entering countries (Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) and twelve insiders (Aus-
tria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom) in years between 2001 and 2006.9 Since the entry occurred at the same
time for all entrants, the time span can be divided into a pre-entry and a post-entry period
(2001-2003 and 2004-2006).10 I use annual data and not a two-period panel to demonstrate
that the ndings equally apply to multi-period panels.
I estimate (8), using two popular estimation methods. First, I estimate with the Fixed
Eects Least Squares Dummy Variables (FE-LSDV) method, which nets out the ij by using
the corresponding within transformation and controls for it and jt by directly including
exporter-year and importer-year dummies among the regressors. Second, I estimate by OLS
on the demeaned variables, which means demeaning the left-hand side variable and Dijt in
(8) from all the xed eects and then estimating  with OLS on the demeaned variables.
(Appendix B derives the within transformation formula for (8).) Both types of estimations
are performed in STATA.
The two methods should, in principle, give identical results. In practice, OLS on the
demeaned gives unbiased estimates only in balanced panels with self-trade (domestic trade)
observations, because the within transformation formula is incorrect otherwise.11 For demon-
stration purposes, I do the estimations both with and without self-trade.12
8For evidence on EU enlargement-induced trade-creation see Hornok (2010, 2011).
9Trade data is from Eurostat.
10I put 2004 in the post-entry period, although the enlargement was in May 2004.
11See M aty as and Bal azsi (2011) for a derivation of the bias. The same problem applies for the within
transformation formula in (4), but not for the within transformation that nets out ij in the FE-LSDV
method.
12I construct self-trade for each country as gross output of all non-services sectors minus total exports of
goods. Self-trade is similarly constructed, among others, in Wei (1996), Novy (2008), Jacks, Meissner and
Novy (2011) and Hornok (2011).
11The EU membership dummies under the rst, second and fourth identication assump-
tions are as follows. Superscripts denote the number of the identication assumption. The







1 if AA and t  2004
0 otherwise
;
which is based on the assumption that EU enlargement aected only the trade of two en-







1 if (AA or AB or BA) and t  2004
0 otherwise
;
based on the assumption that both the trade of two entrants and the trade between entrants







1 if (AB or BA) and t  2004
0 otherwise
;
which looks at the eect on trade between entrants and insiders relative to trade between
two entrants or two insiders. Finally, under the third identication assumption there are two
EU dummies, where D
(3:1)








Table 2 presents the estimation results by identication assumption and by estimation
method for both with and without self-trade observations. The  estimates reinforce the
analytical ndings. Based on the estimates with self-trade, the value of  is -0.007. It can
also be calculated from the pre- to post-entry average changes in the logarithm of trade ac-
cording to  =  dxAA -  dxAB -  dxBA +  dxBB = 0.604 - 0.488 - 0.235 + 0.112. The estimates
under the dierent identication assumptions relate to each other as expected. The estimate
under the second identication assumption is the negative of the estimate under the rst,
and the estimate under the fourth is half of the estimate under the second. None of them
are statistically dierent from zero.
13Notice that it is identical to saying that one-sided membership in the EU has the same eect as joint
membership, since the trade of entrants with insider was not any more aected in 2004.
14It is ultimately the time variation in D, which matters for identication, since the panel xed eects
gravity identies only from time changes. Notice that dierent denitions of D can have identical time
variation.
12Table 2: Estimates for EU with entrants and insiders
FE-LSDV OLS on demeaned
IA ^  Cluster s.e. Within R2 Identied?1 ^ 
with self-trade
1 -0.007 0.059 0.626 Yes -0.007
2 0.007 0.059 0.626 Yes 0.007
3.1 0.459a 0.157 0.626 No (1) dropped
3.2 0.233a 0.077 0.003
4 0.003 0.029 0.626 Yes 0.003
without self-trade
1 0.071 0.056 0.658 Yes 0.073
2 -0.071 0.056 0.658 Yes -0.067
3.1 1.208a 0.257 0.658 No (1) 0.566
3.2 0.569a 0.127 0.247
4 -0.036 0.028 0.658 Yes -0.035
Notes: (8) is estimated with FE-LSDV and OLS on demeaned. N of obs is 2400
with, 2280 without self-trade. The sample includes country pairs of 12 old EU
countries and 8 of the countries that joined the EU in 2004. Dependent variable is
log bilateral exports. Time dimension is years between 2001 and 2006. Pair xed
eects, exporter-year and importer-year dummies included. 1 Number of extra
country-year dummies dropped in bracket. a signicant at 1%, b at 5%.
Signicance is not reported for OLS on demeaned (last column).
The two EU eects under the third identication assumption cannot be separately identi-
ed because of perfect collinearity with the country-time dummies. Yet, quite misleadingly,
the FE-LSDV estimation method reports sizeable and strongly signicant estimates. Only if
one checks how many country-year dummies are dropped (out of the total 2206 = 240), it
turns out that one is dropped instead of the perfectly collinear EU dummy. When self-trade
is in the database, the method of OLS on the demeaned variables (estimates reported in the
last column of Table 2) drops the perfectly collinear EU dummy. However, when self-trade
is not included, it also reports false estimates.15
4 Panel with outsiders
So far I abstracted from countries that never become members of the club (outsiders). Below
I show that extending the sample with nC such countries may help solve the unidentiability
of the club eect. This approach however also has its limitations. When additional dummy
variables are included to control for outsider countries' trade changes, the identication
problems can return.
15Note that, when self-trade is missing, the estimates obtained with the OLS on the demeaned method
are not unbiased, which shows that the within transformation formula is incorrect for unbalanced data.
13Let us consider a panel with three country types with respect to club membership: en-
trants, insiders and outsiders. Outsiders are countries that never become members during
the sample period. These three country types generate nine dierent trade 
ows, as shown
on Figure 3.
Figure 3: Trade 
ows with entrants, insiders and outsiders
inj entrant insider outsider
entrant xAA xAB xAC
insider xBA xBB xBC
outsider xCA xCB xCC
We want to estimate the club eects under the four identication assumptions as before.
Notice however that the benchmark (control group) of the estimation now also includes
trade 
ows with outsiders (xC and xC). This relies on the implicit assumption that what
happens to outsiders' trade is uncorrelated with the club entry, i.e. these observations are
valid benchmark.
The inclusion of outsider countries allows for the identication of heterogeneous club
eects up to four linearly independent club dummies (shown in Appendix A) and leads to
a less restrictive range of estimated eects. One can solve for the  estimates by following
the same steps as in Section 2.2. The estimated coecients can be expressed as linear




 dxAA  dxAB  dxAC  dxBA  dxBB  dxBC  dxCA  dxCB  dxCC
i
;
with some parameter vector, where the elements of the parameter vector are functions of
nA, nB and nC. (Details of the analytical solution are in Appendix C.) I present the
parameter vectors in Table 3 under the simplifying assumption that the number of countries
by type is equal, i.e. nA = nB = nC. Linear combinations of the elements of dx with
these give the  estimates. For instance, the estimated eect under the rst identication
assumption can be expressed as ^ (1) =  dxAA   0:5 
   dxAB +  dxAC +  dxBA +  dxCA

+ 0:25 
   dxBB +  dxBC +  dxCB +  dxCC

.
4.1 EU estimates with outsiders
I extend the EU database with trade 
ows of eight non-EU countries (Switzerland, Israel,
Iceland, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Norway, United States). At the same time, I reduce
the number of insiders to eight, so that nA = nC = nC and comparison with the analytical
14Table 3:  estimates in panels with outsiders (nA = nB = nC)
IA Elements of vector of LHS variable
 dxAA  dxAB  dxAC  dxBA  dxBB  dxBC  dxCA  dxCB  dxCC
1 1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 0.25 0.25 -0.5 0.25 0.25
2 0 0.5 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 0 -0.5 0 0.5
3.1 1 0 -1 0 -0.25 0.25 -1 0.25 0.75
3.2 0 0.5 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 0 -0.5 0 0.5
4 -0.4 0.5 -0.1 0.5 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.2
Notes:  estimates are linear combinations of the elements of dx with the
parameter values in the rows.
solutions in Table 3 is possible.16 The estimation results (with self-trade) are reported in
Table 4. All the eects, including the heterogeneous eect under the third identication
assumption, are identied.
Table 4: Estimates for EU with entrants, insiders and outsiders
FE-LSDV OLS on demeaned
IA ^  Cluster s.e. Within R2 Identied? ^ 
1 -0.266a 0.074 0.478 Yes -0.266
2 -0.230a 0.060 0.479 Yes -0.230
3.1 -0.496a 0.115 0.486 Yes -0.496
3.2 -0.230a 0.059 -0.230
4 -0.032 0.034 0.472 Yes -0.032
Notes: (8) is estimated with FE-LSDV and OLS on demeaned. N of obs: 3456,
also including self-trade. The sample includes country pairs of 8 old EU members,
8 of the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 8 non-EU countries. Dependent
variable is log bilateral exports. Time dimension is years 2001-2006. Pair xed
eects, exporter-year and importer-year dummies included. a signicant at 1%,
b at 5%, c at 10%. Last column shows coecient estimates from OLS on
demeaned, where signicance is not reported.
One can check whether the estimates are in line with the analytical solutions for the s
in Table 3. The vector of the left-hand side variable, which includes the averages of the dxijs




0:604 0:481 0:602 0:265 0:075 0:094 0:590 0:166 0:060
i
:
The  estimate under the rst identication assumption can be calculated as linear combi-
nation of the elements of this vector with the corresponding parameter values in the rst
row of Table 3, i.e. ^ (1) = 0.604 - 0.5(0.481 + 0.602 + 0.265 + 0.590) + 0.25(0.075 + 0.094 +
0.166 + 0.060) = -0.266, which is equal to the estimate in the rst row of Table 4.
16Denmark, Greece, Ireland and Sweden are dropped from the original 12 insiders. The choice is arbitrary.
15The estimates for the EU eect with outsiders are strikingly dierent from the baseline
estimates in Table 2. They are all negative, mostly large in absolute value and statistically
signicant. The dierence is due to the change in the benchmark observations, which now
include all trade with outsiders. Trade between entrants and outsiders (3rd and 7th elements
of dx0) increased especially strongly around EU enlargement, which drives the  estimates
down.
4.2 Controlling for outsider eect
The strong growth in trade between entrants and outsiders is most probably related to EU
entry. The EU is a customs union, which means that entering countries have to adjust their
levels of trade protection with outsiders to the common external trade protection level of the
customs union. Historical data on taris suggests that protection levels between entrants
and outsiders had to decrease considerably with EU entry. If this is not controlled for in the
estimation and trade between entrants and outsiders is part of the benchmark, the estimated
coecients will be downward biased.
Controlling for changes in trade barriers with hard data is often problematic. Available
data on bilateral taris is decient and often not good quality, let alone data on non-tari








1 if (AC or CA) and t  2004
0 otherwise
:
The augmented panel xed eects gravity equation is then
xijt = Dijt + 
D
o
ijt + ij + it + jt + "ijt; (10)
where 
 is the coecient of the outsider dummy.
Since in panels with outsiders the xed eects gravity can identify at most four club
dummies, the inclusion of one extra dummy can, in principle, allow the identication of the
s. Estimation results in Table 5 however show that it is not the case in the current example.
The estimation of (10) is subject to the same identication problems as estimation of (8)
on data without outsiders. The  estimates, which become again small and not signicant,
relate to each other as shown in Section 2.2 and heterogeneous eects cannot be identied
separately. Unidentiability under the third identication assumption is again due to perfect
collinearity among the xed eects and the dummies (shown in Appendix A).
16Table 5: Estimates for EU with entrant-outsider eect
FE-LSDV OLS on demeaned
IA Coecient Estimate Cluster s.e. Within R2 Identied?1 Estimate
1  -0.036 0.068 0.486 Yes -0.036

 0.230a 0.059 0.230
2  0.036 0.068 0.486 Yes 0.036

 0.266a 0.074 0.266
3 1 0.551b 0.269 0.486 No (1) dropped
2 0.294b 0.132 0.018

 0.524a 0.136 0.248
4  0.018 0.034 0.486 Yes 0.018

 0.248a 0.057 0.248
Notes: (10) is estimated with FE-LSDV and OLS on demeaned. N of obs is 3456. The sample
includes country pairs of 8 of the EU-15 countries, 8 of the countries that joined the EU in
2004 and 8 non-EU countries. Dependent variable is log bilateral exports. Time dimension
is years in 2001-2006. Pair xed eects, exporter-year and importer-year dummies included.
1 Number of extra country-year dummies dropped in bracket. a signicant at 1%, b at 5%.
Signicance is not reported for OLS on demeaned.
The advantages of adding outsider observations to the sample are lost, when I control for
entrant-outsider trade eects with an additional dummy variable. Depending on the empir-
ical application, additional outsider dummies may take dierent forms. Sometimes separate
direction-specic entrant-outsider eects or insider-outsider eects should be controlled for.
Table 6 shows identiability of the club eect for these cases. There is no identication
problem with only insider-outsider dummies. When entrant-outsider dummies are included
(common or separate for the two directions), the club dummies under the third identication
assumption cannot be identied. Finally, none of the club eects can be identied, when
separate dummies are included for both insider-outsider and entrant-outsider groups.
Table 6: Identiability with outsider eect dummies
Additional dummies for outsiders
IA AC, CA BC, CB AC, CA, BC, CB
common separate common separate common separate
1 yes yes yes yes yes no
2 yes yes yes yes yes no
3 no no yes yes no no
4 yes yes yes yes yes no
Notes: \yes" and \no" refer to identiability of the club eect under
identication assumptions 1-4, when additional dummies for outsiders'
trade are included. \Common" stands for a common dummy, \separate"
for two direction-specic dummies.
175 Identifying from the trade cost index
The gravity equation, which controls for multilateral trade resistances with xed eects,
cannot produce reliable estimates for the trade eects of EU enlargement. Below I present
estimates from an alternative method, which is proposed by Novy (2008) and Head and Ries
(2001), and which is readily implementable with the available data.















which is already net of the multilateral trade resistances. The index captures relative (inter-
national to domestic) trade barriers between two countries and, as shown in Novy (2008),
it can be expressed as the ratio of domestic trade 
ows in the two countries (self-trade) to
their international trade 
ows. Notice that the index is an average of the two directions of
trade and hence, it is not able to identify direction-specic eects.
I calculate  for each country pair and year in the sample with the 8 insiders, 8 entrants
and 8 outsiders. In line with the literature, which estimates the elasticity of substitution to
be in the range of 5 to 10, I assume  = 7.5.17 The eect of EU enlargement on bilateral
trade costs can then be estimated with the equation
lnijt = Dijt + !D
o
ijt + ij + t + ijt; (12)
where ij are country pair xed eects and t captures a common time trend in trade
barriers. The estimates for  and ! measure how much bilateral trade barriers fell with EU
enlargement, the latter capturing the fall between entrants and outsiders. The expected sign
of the estimates is negative. Estimates are relative to the benchmark, which includes trade
of two insiders, trade of two outsiders, and trade between insiders and outsiders.








= (1   ) ^ : (13)
The estimation results are presented in Table 7, with the implied changes in trade 
ows
in the last column. Under every identication assumption I estimate a signicant decrease
in bilateral trade barriers and, hence, increase in bilateral trade 
ows. The trade increase for
entrant-entrant and entrant-insider pairs (second identication assumption) is estimated to
17See the assessment of Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) on the empirical estimates of the elasticity of
substitution.
18be around 40 per cent, which is induced by a 5.6 percentage points (ad valorem) decrease in
bilateral trade costs.18 Nearly half as strong a trade increase is estimated for trade between
entrants and insiders than trade of two entrants.
Table 7: Estimates with trade cost index
IA coecient estimate cluster s.e. within R2 Trade eect
1  -0.074a 0.007 0.484 0.483
! -0.061a 0.010 0.399
2  -0.056a 0.005 0.495 0.364
! -0.076a 0.010 0.494
3 1 -0.089a 0.007 0.512 0.578
2 -0.042a 0.005 0.271
! -0.076a 0.010 0.494
4  -0.025a 0.005 0.4427 0.162
! -0.059a 0.010 0.384
Notes: (12) is estimated with pair xed eects and common time dummies.
N = 1656. The sample includes country pairs of 8 of the EU-15 countries,
8 of the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 8 non-EU countries.
Dependent variable is log of the trade cost index in (11). Time dimension
is years in 2001-2006. a signicant at 1%.
6 Summary and Discussion
This paper argues that the theory-consistent xed eects gravity equation, which controls
for the multilateral trade resistances with xed eects, has serious limitation in identifying
the eects of certain \club membership" dummies. The xed eects leave only the bilateral
(time-varying bilateral) variation in the data, while the club membership dummy has very
little variation in this dimension. As a result, in several settings, only one parameter can
be identied. The estimated eects under dierent identication assumptions dier in a
non-intuitive way and heterogeneous club eects (e.g. joint versus one-sided membership)
cannot be identied separately. Standard estimation methods do not necessarily report these
problems.
These ndings, though quite general, do not extend to all kinds of club dummies and
databases. The identication limitations are less severe, if the bilateral (time-varying bi-
lateral) variation in the club dummy is richer than in the presented baseline case. Possible
ways to overcome the identication problems are as follows.
18These estimated eects re
ect decreases both in tari and non-tari type trade barriers. The latter
includes various types of barriers such as administrative costs, time costs, institutional and informational
barriers, or political risk.
19In cross section applications, the identication problems persist as long as the club
dummy represents only one club. This means that one cannot identify the eect of WTO,
NAFTA, euro area, or being English-speaker. One can however identify the eect of free
trade agreements, common currency or common language, if these dummy variables incor-
porate several categories of trade agreement, currency and language. The more categories
they include, the more bilateral variation they oer for identication.
In panel applications, one way to increase the time-varying bilateral variation of the club
dummy is to look at sequential entries to the club, i.e. when dierent countries enter the
club in dierent dates. Again, the more entries one has at dierent dates, the more variation
there is for identication. Naturally, this solution is not available if one wants to analyze
the eect of a single event, such as the EU enlargement in 2004 or the euro area creation in
1999.
Another possibility with panel data, discussed in Section 4, is to include three types of
countries in the panel with respect to club membership: entrants, insiders and outsiders. I
showed that in such a database heterogeneous club eects can be identied up to 4 dierent
(linearly independent) club dummies. This approach however also has its potential pitfalls.
Introducing additional dummies to capture club-related changes in outsider countries' trade
can bring the identication problems back.
Finally, it is worth considering to apply alternative methods of controlling for the mul-
tilateral trade resistances. I demonstrate it by applying the method of Novy (2008) on the
example of EU enlargement in 2004. Other alternative methods are structural estimation
(Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003, Bergstrand, Egger and Larch, 2012) or linear approx-
imation of the multilateral trade resistances (Baier and Bergstrand, 2009). A drawback
is that the alternative methods are often more computation- and/or data-demanding than
xed eects estimation.
Although this paper considers the gravity equation of international trade per se, it con-
veys a more general message. It demonstrates a pitfall of relying on xed eects extensively
to control for the unobserved variables in the estimation. If the xed eects net out most
of the useful data variation, identication problems can be present even if standard estima-
tion methods do not report them. These lessons are potentially also useful for empirical
researchers in other elds, where multidimensional panel data sets are common and xed
eects are often used.
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23A Unidentiability of heterogeneous club eects
One way to see that more than one club dummies cannot be identied in (3) is to write out









1 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0 1






The elements of the matrix are column vectors of ones or zeros of dimensions nA
2 in the
rst, nAnB in the second and third and nB
2 in the fourth rows of the matrix. The rst two
columns of the matrix are the exporter xed eects, the third column includes the importer
xed eects for members (importer xed eects for non-members omitted) and the last two
columns are the two club dummies. Since the number of linearly independent columns should
always be equal to the number of linearly independent rows, the ve column vectors of this
matrix cannot be linearly independent. The exporter and importer xed eects already take
3 out of the maximum 4 linearly independent column vectors, so there is room left for only
one linearly independent club dummy.
Of course, having only one club dummy is a necessary but not sucient condition for
linear independence and, hence, identication. Even if there is only a single club dummy,
identication is not possible if the regressor matrix is of decient rank. This means that the
club dummy is constructed so that it is perfectly collinear with one or more of the country
xed eects. This would be the case e.g. if one wanted to estimate the eect on xAA and
xAB, relative to xBA and xBB. In this case the club dummy is, by construction, perfectly
collinear with the exporter xed eect for members (rst column of the regressor matrix).
In panel estimation of (8), when trade of entrants, insiders and outsiders are all included in
the database (discussed in Section 4), the club eect under the third identication assumption
is also identied. This can be seen by looking at the corresponding matrix of regressors in






6 6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6
4
1 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
3
7 7 7 7 7 7
7 7 7 7 7
7 7 7 7 7
5
; (15)
where the rows are in order AA, AB, AC, BA, BB, BC, CA, CB, CC, and the elements of the
matrix are vectors of ones or zeros of the following dimensions: nA
2 in the rst, nAnB in the
second and fourth, nAnC in the third and seventh, nB
2 in the fth, nBnC in the sixth and
eighth and nC
2 in the ninth rows of the matrix, where nC is the number of outsider countries.
The rst three columns of the matrix are the exporter dummies, the fourth and fth columns
are the importer dummies (importer dummy for outsiders omitted) and the last two columns
are the two club dummies under the third identication assumption. The extension of the
database with outsider countries increases the number of rows of the regressor matrix to
nine, which also increases the maximum possible number of linearly independent column
vectors to nine. Since ve columns are reserved for the country dummies, it is possible to
identify at most four club eects separately.19
When entrant-outsider eects are controlled for by an additional dummy variable as in
(10), unidentiability under the third identication assumption is due to a decient rank
19An alternative way to check identiability is to write out the regressor matrix (M) and check whether
the determinant of M0M is zero (singular matrix) or approximately zero (near singular matrix). A singular
or near singular matrix indicates perfect collinearity.
25regressor matrix,
h





6 6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6
4
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
3
7 7
7 7 7 7 7




Although the number of rows (nine) is greater than the number of columns (eight), there
is perfect collinearity among the column vectors. Perfect collinearity arises from the linear
relationship among the exporter and importer xed eects for entrants, the two club dummies
and Do of the form 2v6 +v7 +v8  v1  v4 = 0, where the vs are the column vectors of (16)
in order.
B The demeaning formula for the panel specication
I derive the demeaning (within transformation) formula for the error structure of the xed
eects panel estimation (8). The derivation is based on the general solution in Davis (2002).
More recently, the formula was also derived in M aty as and Bal azsi (2011).
The xed eects panel specication for international trade data can be represented with
the error structure
uijt = ij + it + jt + "ijt; (17)
where i = 1;:::;N denote exporters, j = 1;:::;M importers and t = 1;:::;T time, ij, it and
jt are the unobservable pair-specic, exporter-year and importer-year eects, respectively.
In vector form,
u = Z + Z + Z + "; (18)
where ,  and  are vectors of parameters to estimate of dimension NMTNM, NMTNT
and NMT  MT, respectively, and Z = INM 
 T, Z = IN 
 M 
 IT and Z = N 
 IMT.
I is the identity matrix and  is the vector of ones of given dimension and 
 denotes the
Kronecker product.20
20A useful property of the Kronecker product (mixed-product property) is that (A 
 B)  (C 
 D) =
AC 
 BD, given that the dimensions of the matrices are such that taking their product is possible.







0. The orthogonal projection matrix is Q[Z] = I  P[Z]. P and Q are symmetric
and idempotent. Note that P[Z] = INM 
  JT averages the data over t, where  JT = 1
TJT with
JT being the matrix of ones of dimension T. Similarly, P[Z] = IN 
  JM 
 IT averages the
data over j and P[Z] =  JN 
 IMT averages the data over i. For example, in the last case,
   JN 
 IMT





The general solution for the within transformation matrix according to Davis (2002) is
Q[Z] = Q[A]   P[B]   P[C]; (19)
where A = Z, B = Q[A]Z = Q[Z]Z and C = Q[B]Q[A]Z = Q[Q[Z]Z]Q[Z]Z.
It is straightforward to show that
Q[A] =
 




The second term can be expressed as
P[B] =
 
IN    JN


  JM 
 IT;
where I used that Q[A]Z =
 




 IT. The third them is
P[C] =
 









where I used that Q[A]Q[B]Z =
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 IMT   IN 
  JM 
 IT   INM 
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+ IN 
  JMT +  JN 
 IM 
  JT +  JNM 
 IT    JNMT
with a typical element
 u = Q[Z]u = uijt    u:jt    ui:t    uij: +  ui:: +  u:j: +  u::t    u:::; (20)
where  u:jt = N 1 P
i uijt,  ui:t = M 1 P
j uijt,  uij: = T  1 P




 u:j: = (NT) 1 P
t
P
i uijt,  u::t = (NM) 1 P
j
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The estimation method 'OLS on the demeaned' is done by demeaning the variables as in
(20) and estimating the regression equation with the demeaned variables. It is important to
add that this formula is derived for a \full" trade matrix. This means that the database is
balanced and, if some countries are both exporters and importers in the database (which is
almost always the case), data on trade of these countries with themselves (self-trade) should
also be included.
27C Deriving the estimates for panel with outsiders
If I do not assume nA = nB = nC, the demeaned left-hand side variable can be expressed as
 dx = a1  dxAA+a2  dxAB +a3  dxAC +a4  dxBA+a5  dxBB +a6  dxBC +a7  dxCA+a8  dxCB +a9  dxCC;
where the as are vectors, whose elements are functions of nA, nB and nC. Expressing the as
in terms of the number of countries it becomes
2
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 nA (nA + nC)
nAnB
nAnB
 nA (nA + nC)
nAnB
3
7 7 7 7









6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6
4
 nC (nB + nC)
 nC (nB + nC)
(nA + nB)(nB + nC)
nAnC
nAnC
 nA (nA + nB)
nAnC
nAnC
 nA (nA + nB)
3
7
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7







6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6
4
 nB (nB + nC)
nAnB
nAnB
(nA + nC)(nB + nC)
 nA (nA + nC)
 nA (nA + nC)





7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7







6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6




 nB (nA + nC)
n2
B
 nB (nA + nC)
(nA + nC)2
 nB (nA + nC)
n2
B




7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7






6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6




 nB (nA + nB)
 nC (nA + nC)
 nC (nA + nC)
(nA + nB)(nA + nC)
nBnC
nBnC
 nB (nA + nB)
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7







6 6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
6
4
 nC (nB + nC)
nAnC
nAnC
 nC (nB + nC)
nAnC
nAnC
(nA + nB)(nB + nC)
 nA (nA + nB)
 nA (nA + nB)
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7






6 6 6 6 6 6




 nC (nA + nC)
nBnC
nBnC
 nC (nA + nC)
nBnC
 nB (nA + nB)
(nA + nB)(nA + nC)
 nB (nA + nB)
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7






6 6 6 6 6 6












 nC (nA + nB)
 nC (nA + nB)
 nC (nA + nB)
(nA + nB)2
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
5
 dxCC:
The demeaned club dummy is  dD = a1 under the rst identication assumption,  dD =
a1 + a2 + a3 under the second and  dD = a2 + a3 under the fourth. The matrix of the two
28demeaned club dummies under the third identication assumption is  dD =
h
a1 a2 + a3
i
,
where a1 and a2 + a3 are column vectors of the matrix. To express the policy eect







0  dx under each identication assumption separately.
29